Introduction
After 2008, most of the EU countries were trying to cut their public expenses to stabilize fiscal imbalances. We think that there is only limited space for decreasing the expenses and governments should rather focus on measures supporting efficiency and effectiveness improvements. One of urgent areas to change is the public procurement. Until now, most of the public procurement studies focus on usage of electronic auctions, transparency or corruption in public procurement, but there are only few articles, which are analysing competitiveness, selection method and legislative gaps. In our article, we are analysing these three topics, where the increase of efficiency by significant share is fully possible.
Factors influencing performance of public procurement system
Public procurement, especially in transitional and post-transitional countries can be the major area for efficiency improvements. Many experts feel (Pavel, 2013 ) that 10-20% savings in public procurement in our conditions are target that can be very simply achieved by improving the system. This may mean that about 3% of GDP are available for more effective use!
The literature also describes and analyses possible purposes for such a large inefficiency of the public procurement process in our conditions. The cross-cutting issue is the corruption. According to existing data, the general level of corruption in transitional and posttransitional countries is really high (see for example Transparency International data) and unavoidably influences also public procurement and its results. The response by increased transparency does not help much, just motivates for more sophisticated ways of channelling public resources via procurement (see recent scandals).
Bušina, (2013a) mentions in connection with public procurement the need to adhere not only to so called transparency but also to moral and ethical principles. Bureaucracy, confusing legislative system, often legislation amendments and change of requirements of the government significantly destabilize, make conditions more severe and make the law enforceability more complex. He mentions following concrete issues -high level of fluctuation at key positions (ministers, vice-ministers, department managers, state owned company managers etc.), instalment of laymen to positions that require professional qualification (instead of employing eligible people from the point of view qualification and security at such positions), low capability to understand the line of business and resulting problems in the field of the withdrawal of EU subsidies.
Not only "active corruption" is well described by existing literature (Rose Ackerman, 1999), but more and more authors analyse also "passive corruption". This concept is relatively new but already investigated also in our conditions (Pavel, 2013) . "Passive corruption" means wasting public money for nobody´s interest, without direct corruption. In the later analysis we deal with two from its many dimensions. First is the issue of the "bureaucratic safety" and its impact on award criteria. The second is the existence of legislative gaps with definite negative impact on the realisation processes.
A lot of literature focuses on competitiveness. Authors, like Kuhlman and Johnson, 1983 , Brannan, 1987 , Gupta, 2002 , Ilke et al, 2012 or Pavel, 2009 in our conditions, propose that competitiveness is one of major factors influencing results from public procurement. It is hardly possible to achieve efficiency and/or quality gains, if too few potential suppliers compete for a government contract. Gupta (2002) for example calculated that the increase in the number of candidates from two to eight implied achieving additional savings in average status was reached with 6 candidates, the increase in number of candidates from 2 to 6 meant additional savings in average 9 to 10%).
Passive corruption and competitiveness are two core issues of our paper. However, we add third one, rather specific for our conditions -the existence of legislative gaps and the restrictive interpretation of the PP law. Unfortunately, legislators react to main PP scandals via amending the PP law and creating it more and more restrictive. We document that such approach can lead to large inefficiencies -value for money, which is the core PP principle, cannot be achieved by bureaucracy, but by managerial flexibility.
Price as the main selection criterion
Our assumption is that too much bureaucracy in procurement motivates non-corrupted public officials (because of "safety" principle) to use economy (lowest price) as the selection criterion compared to efficiency (best bid). According to the existing literature (summarised for example by Pavel, 2013) economy shall be used only in cases where the procurer can really well specify ordered goods, services or works. There are no generally valid estimates, but this should mean that a lowest price is the main selection criterion for goods, but less important selection criterion for services and works.
Our data compiled from the international statistics for selected countries (most important CEE countries, UK as example of Anglo-Saxon managerialism, France as example of different public administration system and Austria and Germany as neighbours with
Weberian tradition) are displayed by Figures 1-2 (EU PP statistics data processed). These data clearly show that the main principle for selecting suppliers in CEE conditions -also for services and works, where this is not appropriate -is the lowest price criterion. An example of a public procurement contract chosen by the lowest price criterion, we can now point out to in the Czech Republic is the key transport artery as currently under construction, namely the motorway D1. We can already see in this case that the choice of the lowest price criterion was not the best solution and influences the implementation of the project: completion date is being postponed; it generates problems between the contractor and contracting party; litigations are under way concerning use of improper materials in order to reduce input costs on the part of the contractor; litigations are under way as to alleged poor quality of tendering documentation the contractor used for the preparation of the price quotation; endeavour to get maximum profit by means of increasing prices (of extra works). Source: Bušina, 2013b Reasons that lead individual building companies to quote dumping prices may be as follows (Bušina, 2014) -awarding the contract in order to resolve company´s own economic problems using newly obtained financial resources; awarding the contract in order to keep the current turnover because of dependency on bank guarantees or current accounts; undermining of the public tender in order to be able to blackmail other candidates to force them to come with a financial proposal or sub-contract; awarding the contract at dumping price planning to misuse mistakes in the tender documentation to require extra works; awarding the contract at dumping price being aware of mistakes in the tender documentation and planning to start a litigation.
Tab. 1: D1 Motorway Reconstruction Public Contract
The same important is to mention the fact that another noticeable phenomenon has been emerging since quite some time simultaneously with dumping prices that are highly current at the time being based on the lowest price criterion in public procurement tenders.
Such phenomenon that threatens the economy of the country is the misuse of administration procedures run by the antimonopoly authority based on proposals and filings to the authority.
If we look at the figure 3-4, we can see that this filing trend shows a permanently growing tendency. This growing tendency may be attributed to unfair practices of individual candidates that accompany the public procurement and directly affect the behaviour of the human factor in public tenders as competitors get inconvenienced due to unsubstantiated interventions in individual contracts. (Bušina, 2014) 
Fig. 4: Number of received inducements
Source: Bušina, 2014 Comparing individual proposals to start administration procedures starting from 2008 to 2014, we can conclude that many of the entities whose "filings" protract the tendering process withdraw their filings without being held responsible in any way. This fact is even more supported by the fact that the antimonopoly authority does not require any security.
We argue, that bureaucratic decisions of the regulatory body (UHOS) in the recent years simply push procurers to opt for safe, but frequently ineffective decisions. We do not have data for CIS countries, but for example in Georgia, lowest price is the only available selection criterion, for Russia the situation is almost the same (Ivanov, 2014) .
Competitiveness
This issue is already investigated in the Czech literature. Pavel (2013) 
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In this part we very briefly highlight two selected legislative gaps (and legislation interpretations), parts of the Czech public procurement law, which significantly and in negative way influence the efficiency of the public procurement process.
The first issue is the "aggregation rule" -procurers shall cumulate values of goods or service supplies for the whole accounting year (for example paper supplies during the year cannot be realized as independent supplies, but represent one cumulative supply) and especially "cannot split the procured item with the intention to procure with simpler methods" 
Conclusion
Our paper argues that the best way how to balance the public revenues and expenditures today are efficiency improvements and provides important example of one area with large improvement potential -public procurement. According to our estimates up to 5% (or may be even more with more pessimistic approach) of GDP is wasted because of allocative and technical inefficiencies in our public sector, from it may be 3 % via ineffective public procurement.
From many factors determining the success of public procurement we investigated in the Czech conditions three -"passive corruption" from the point of view of improper use of price as selection criterion, competitiveness and selected legislative gaps with the negative impact on procurement process. Data and examples provided clearly show that there is a lot of space for improvements and all three factors discussed need much more professional and especially political attention.
